![]() Today, no one scans the help wanted adverts for employment as an elevator operator. Within ten years, nearly all had lost their jobs to automation. Automatic passenger elevators: The Robotics Business Review a while back evocatively provided this example: "In 1958, a wave rose and crested over Manhattan where 200,000 people went to work each day as elevator operators.Like McAfee and Brynjolfsson, many techno-optimists point to historical evidence that technological disruption in the past has overall been beneficial to both productivity growth and employment: Their book, "The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies," is cautiously optimistic about the impact of technology evolution on employment and income inequality. In this post we’ll dissect the techno-optimist position with a fine scalpel.Īndy McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson are two good examples of mainstream techno-optimism. Dystopians expect generalized AI penetration and rapid productivity growth, resulting in persistent mass unemployment and a permanent underclass.Traditionalists believe that automation technologies will eventually have a material impact in some specific applications and verticals, leading to slow and steady unemployment in those areas.Techno-pessimists acknowledge the advance of robots, automation, and AI, but do not expect the impact on labor productivity or employment to be meaningful enough to make a difference.Techno-optimists believe machines will replace humans, but also that the displaced humans will find alternate and meaningful employment as a result.In order to put some semblance of order to the situation, we proposed a 2x2 matrix: 84, 24–32 (2014).In our previous blog post on the macroeconomic impact of automation we went off on a bit of a pop culture and high culture tangent before getting to the crux of the matter, that the automation debate has many angles and is far from settled. Wider, Taller, Heavier: Evolution of Light Duty Vehicle Size Over Generations (Global Fuel Economy Initiative, 2017) Ĭooper, D. The Global Status of CCS: 2017 (Global CCS Institute, 2017) Sustainable Energy - Without the Hot Air (UIT Cambridge, Cambridge, 2008).ĭigest of UK Energy Statistics (BEIS, 2018) Towards the Circular Economy: Accelerating the Scale-up Across Global Supply Chains (World Economic Forum, 2014) Īllwood, J. More from Less - Material Resource Efficiency in Europe (EEA, 2016) G7 Meeting on Resource Efficiency (European Commission, 2017) ![]() Resource Efficiency: Potential and Economic Implications (International Resource Panel, 2017) However, as our response to resource shortages is to use more energy - whether in desalinating and moving water, processing lower grade ores or in more intensive agriculture - and as, on a global scale, most energy comes from fossil fuels, this response acts to accelerate climate change. ![]() Already, most industrial greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which contribute a third of the world’s non-agricultural emissions, arise in the extraction and production of bulk materials 5. But it does matter because of climate change. It does not matter because we are running out of key resources - critical minerals become ‘critical’ due to a short-term misalignment of supply and demand that can be resolved following investment or political realignment. To the Editor - The recent rate of growth in publications on resource efficiency 1, 2, 3, 4 seems to be matched only by the rate at which our use of materials keeps growing: political interest in discussing the topic is not translating to meaningful action. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |